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PRICE DISCRIMINATION TRENDS UNDER
PERKINS v. STANDARD OIL CO. AND
FTC v. FRED MEYER, INC.
by S. Powell Bridges*
United States manufacturers selling directly to domestic retailers and
wholesalers (dual distribution) have until recently sold products of
"like grade and quality", without legal sanction, at the same price to
all classes of customers, or at different prices to retailers and whole-
salers so long as the prices to retailers were no less than prices charged
to wholesalers.- Since retailers and wholesalers ordinarily do not di-
rectly compete for the same trade, it was believed that injury to com-
petition was unlikely to result from price differences in selling to
different classes of customers. By selling at the same price to all cus-
tomers,2 manufacturers may still comply with Section 2(a) of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act.3 The United States Supreme Court recently enunci-
ated in FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc.4 and Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of
California5 that manufacturers may be liable for treble damages and
government prosecution if: 1) they sell to wholesalers at a lower price
than they sell to retailers, and 2) the wholesalers sell at prices which
are more or less than the prices charged by the manufacturer in direct
sales to retailers.
Under Perkins a manufacturer may violate Section 2(a) when
wholesale customers "pass onf' their lower prices through any number
of levels of distribution to retailers competing with retailers purchasing
* Mr. Bridges, formerly an attorney with the Federal Trade Commission, is a
member of the Iinois Bar.
1 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
2 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960). But see Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.
1957); E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
3 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, . . . where the effect of such
discrimination may be . . . to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination,
or with customers of either of them ....
This was a 1936 amendment to the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.
4 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
5 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
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directly from the manufacturer at higher prices. Similarly, the manu-
facturer may fail to comply with Section 2(a) when the wholesaler is
not "passing on" the favored price, so that the wholesaler's price to his
retail customer does not enable that customer to compete with a retailer
purchasing at a lower price directly from the manufacturer. Fred
Meyer held that the "passing on" of advertising allowances was pro-
hibited under Section 2(d), unless made available to all customers,6 and
fairness would require similar treatment as to pricing under Section
2(a).
In Fred Meyer and Perkins the Court interpreted the language of Sec-
tions 2(a) and 2(d) as intending equality between competing retailers.
In Fred Meyer retailers purchasing through wholesalers were held to
be "customers" of the manufacturer even though the manufacturer had
no direct dealing with the retailer. In Perkins the Court extended the
statutory terminology of "customer" to the "fourth level" of competition,
which is one level further from the manufacturer than the "customer" of
a favored "purchaser" as defined by the statute. In each case a new
and liberal interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act enabled the Court
to protect a small retailer from injury caused by a large purchaser paying
less for the same product.
THIE PERKINS CASE
In 1955 Clyde A. Perkins was one of the largest independent whole-
sale and retail distributors of oil and gas in the Pacific Northwest. He
purchased gasoline exclusively from the area's largest supplier and price
leader, Standard Oil Company of California (Standard), and he de-
livered it to about sixty service stations leased by him to two wholly
owned corporations which then subleased the stations to independent
operators. Standard also sold oil and gasoline directly to branded
dealers, 7 wholesalers, commercial users, and directly to the public.
One of Standard's largest purchasers was Signal Gas and Oil Com-
pany (Signal), a wholesaler selling to various jobbers including its 60%
6 Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964),
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for
the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such
person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or com-
modities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such
payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
7 These were independent service stations selling gasoline under the trade names
"Chevron" and "Signal."
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owned subsidiary, Western Hyway Oil Company (Western), which in
turn sold primarily to Regal Stations Company (Regal), its 55% owned
subsidiary operating retail service stations in direct competition with
Perkin's service stations. The minority ownership of both Western and
Regal was in third parties; no officers or directors of either corporation
served in a similar capacity with the other corporation, and Signal did
not exercise control in the management of either corporation.
Standard's net prices to both Signal and its branded retail dealers
were lower than its prices to Perkins. Standard charged branded dealers
lower prices by guaranteeing them a fixed mark up over their selling
price during price wars, by paying clean rest room bonuses, and by
their use of Standard's credit cards. Standard's lower prices to Signal,
given because Signal supplied scarce crude oil to Standard, were passed
at least in part, through Western to Regal.
From 1955 until 1957 a retail price war, led by Regal and the branded
dealers, forced Perkins to reduce his selling prices to dealers or to accept
significantly reduced sales volume. This led to serious losses by Per-
kins, and in 1957 he was forced to sell the remnants of his business to
Union Oil Company of California, a large competitor of Standard.
The District Court held that Perkins had been injured by Standard's
lower prices to both branded dealers and Signal. Perkins was awarded
actual damages in excess of $333,000 which when trebled and added to
attorneys fees totaled almost $1,300,000. On appeal the Ninth Circuit
agreed as to Perkins' damages resulting from Standard's sales at lower
prices to branded dealers, but it held that injury resulting from lower
prices to Signal passed through Western to Regal, was beyond the scope
of the Robinson-Patman Act because Regal, at the fourth level of dis-
tribution, was too far removed from Standard. Damages awarded in the
lower court were not upheld because that court failed to specify the
amount of damage resulting from Standard's sales to branded dealers.8
The United States Supreme Court, in a decision by Justice Black,
reinstated the District Court's award of damages, and held that the
language of Section 2(a) does not limit the application of the Act to
primary line (manufacturer), secondary line (customer) or tertiary
line (customer of a customer) injury. It can also apply to injury result-
ing from fourth level competition, which was Regal's level or, if "causal
connection" can be shown between the price discrimination and the
injuries suffered, damages can be recovered for injuries at any level of




competition. The Court rejected a limitation to third level competition
of Section 2(a) stating: "We conclude that this limitation is wholly an
artificial one and is completely unwarranted by the language or purpose
of the Act."9
The Court relied on Fred Meyer (discussed below) in which a re-
tailer who buys through a wholesaler was held to be a "customer" of
the original supplier within the meaning of Section 2(d) which per-
tains to discrimination in advertising allowances. The Court noted
that:
In FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968), we held that a
retailer who buys through a wholesaler could be considered a 'customer'
of the original supplier within the meaning of § 2(d) of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, a section dealing with
discrimination in promotional allowances which is closely analogous to
§ 2(a) involved in this case. In Meyer, the Court stated that to read
'customer' narrowly would be wholly untenable when viewed in light
of the purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act. Similarly, to read 'cus-
tomer' more narrowly in this section than we did in the section involved
in Meyer would allow price discriminators to avoid the sanctions of
the Act. .... 10
The Court has construed the Robinson-Patman Act to require a con-
sistent enforcement of Section 2(a) and 2(d). Requiring equal prices
to all retailers, except as provided by the statutory defenses to Section
2(a), appears to be as consistent with the purpose of the Act as does
equal advertising allowances. 1'
In Perkins the Court mentioned Standard's knowledge of injury to
Perkins resulting from its lower prices to Signal being "passed on" to
Regal. The court stated:
There was evidence that Signal received a lower price from Standard
than did Perkins, that this price advantage was passed on, at least in
part, to Regal, and that Regal was thereby able to undercut Perkins'
price on gasoline. Furthermore, there was evidence that Perkins re-
peatedly complained to Standard officials that the discriminatory price
advantage given Signal was being passed down to Regal and evidence
that Standard officials were aware that Perkins' business was in danger
of being destroyed by Standard's discriminatory practices. This evi-
dence is sufficient to sustain the jury's award of damages under the
Robinson-Patman Act.
12
9 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 U.S. 642, 647 (1969).
10 Id.
11 FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349-52 (1968).
12 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 U.S. 642, 649 (1969). Compare as
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If retailers having no direct contact with the manufacturer are allowed
to sue the manufacturer for treble damages for violation of Section 2
(a) (discussed below), the Court's mentioning of Perkins' repeated com-
plaints to Standard, and Standard's continued sale to Signal at lower
prices, probably requires proof in such lawsuits that a manufacturer has
knowledge of the injury at the retail level caused by its discounts.
Arguably, if the manufacturer does not have this knowledge he may
not be held liable under this interpretation of Section 2(a).
THE FRED MEYER CASE
Fred Meyer, Inc. (Meyer), a retailer, sold grocery products, drugs,
variety items and wearing apparel through a chain of thirteen retail
supermarkets in the Portland, Oregon area. In 1957 its sales ex-
ceeded $40 million making this company the second largest seller
of all goods in the area. Since 1936 Meyer had conducted annual
promotions which were largely paid for by its suppliers. In 1957
seventy-two suppliers, such as Tri-Valley Packing Association, Idaho
Canning Company and Burlington Industries, Inc., participated in
Meyer's coupon book promotion by purchasing a page in Meyer's
coupon book for at least $350. Some gave additional allowances in the
form of free goods, price discounts, or replacement, at no charge, of a
predetermined amount of goods sold. Consumers bought these coupon
books from Meyer for ten cents, and could then purchase the seventy-
two products advertised in the book for as much as one-third off regular
prices.
Wholesalers in the area, such as Hudson House and Waldhams &
Company, who purchased the same products from the same suppliers,
were not offered price discounts and advertising allowances com-
parable to those received by Meyer. Consequently, various retailers
who purchased the products from wholesalers were competing with
Meyer for retail sales without the benefit of Meyer's favored prices
and advertising allowances.
The Federal Trade Commission determined that Meyer had violated
Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act'13 by inducing and receiving
prices which it knew, or should have known, violated Section 2(a), and
that Meyer had also violated Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Com-
to the requirement that the manufacturer have knowledge of injury: Standard Oil
Co. v. FrC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
13 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is pro-
hibited by this section.
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mission Act14 by the inducement of promotional aid forbidden by Sec-
tion 2(d). 1r, On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court agreed with
the Federal Trade Commission that Meyer's dealings with its suppliers
could have violated both Sections 2(a) and 2(d). However, it reversed
the Commission in part and held that there had been no violation of
Section 2 (d) since suppliers were not required to make the promotional
payments paid to Meyer available to wholesalers who resold to Meyer's
retail competitors. The court held that wholesalers were not competing
in the distribution of such products with Meyer as would be required
by a literal interpretation of Section 2(d). 16
Contrary to both the Commission's and the Court of Appeals' hold-
ings, the United States Supreme Court held that Meyer's suppliers were
responsible for making available promotional allowances to retailers
who competed directly with Meyer. If suppliers could not themselves
effectively administer advertising allowance programs to these retailers,
they could use their wholesale customers to distribute promotional al-
lowances to retailers. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the ma-
jority, stated:
We conclude that the most reasonable construction of § 2(d) is one
which places on the supplier the responsibility for making promotional
allowances available to those resellers who compete directly with the
favored buyer.
17
The Court rejected the argument of Meyer that for Section 2(d) to
apply some direct selling contact was required between the supplier and
the indirect buying retailers. The Court of Appeals' approval of the
Commission's Section 2(a) order based on a finding that Meyer com-
peted in the resale of these suppliers' products with retailers who pur-
chased through wholesalers, led the Court to conclude that the Com-
mission need not resort to the indirect customer doctrine. The Court
stated: "Whether suppliers deal directly with disfavored competitors
or not, they can, and here did, afford a direct buyer the kind of
competitive advantage which § 2(d) was intended to eliminate."18
The Court did not accept the indirect purchaser doctrine 9 which
requires some direct contact or dealing for a supplier to be respon-
14 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1969) provides:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.
15 Fred Meyer, Inc., 63 F.T.C. 1, 26-27 (1963).
16 Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FrC, 359 F.2d 351, 369 (9th Cir. 1966).
17 FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 357 (1968).
18 Id. at 354.
19 Purolator Products, Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1045 (1968); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1956).
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sible to an indirect purchaser for discrimination. Although this ruling
requires a manufacturer to make advertising allowances under Sec-
tion 2(d) available to indirect buying retailers, it is arguable that
it should also apply to price discrimination under Section 2(a). The
small retailer competing with a large direct buying retailer is injured no
less by a wholesaler's failure to "pass on" a lower price to him than he is
by discriminatory advertising allowances being available only to the
direct buying retailer.
The Court discussed the legislative history and purpose of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act as follows:
The draftsman of the provision which eventually emerged as Section
2(d) explained that, even when such payments were made for actual
sales promotional services, they were a form of indirect price dis-
crimination because the recipient of the allowances could shift part of
his advertising costs to his supplier while his disfavored competitor
could not.
20
That the purpose of Section 2(d) is to supplement Section 2(a) by
curbing preference of large buyers, based on their greater purchasing
power, is made manifest throughout the opinion.21 Although the Court
was not required here to rule on Section 2(a) issues, protection of small
retailers competing with larger retailers, in fairness, should apply to all
forms of price discrimination, whether under Section 2(d) or 2(a).
SYNOPSIS
Perkins and Fred Meyer dictate that Sections 2(a) and 2(d) must
be applied consistently to accomplish the purposes of the Robinson-
Patman Act. In both cases the Court expands the Act to protect the
small retailer from the purchasing power of the large buyer. The
Perkins decision allowed a retailer to recover damages from a supplier
by the Court's extension of the term "customer" under Section 2(a)
to include any customer at any level of distribution so long as the
"causal connection" is established between the price discrimination
and the injury. In Fred Meyer, the Court expanded the meaning of
the term "customer" under Section 2(d) to include indirect buying
retailers, and it thereby made manufacturers responsible for making
advertising allowances available to indirect buying retailers, or for the
"supervision or policing" of wholesale customers to insure that the
manufacturers' promotional allowances pass through wholesalers to in-
direct buying retailers.
20 FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 351 (1968).
21 Id. at 349-52.
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Retailers purchasing through wholesalers have never been able to
sue the manufacturer for treble damages for price discrimination un-
less they had some direct contact with the manufacturer. 22  Fred Meyer
makes manufacturers responsible to retailers with whom they have no
direct contact, and these indirect buying retailers are probably able to
recover damages from manufacturers only. The tendency of the Court
to extend the Robinson-Patman Act's application to protect small re-
tailers against the buying power of large purchasers may enable re-
tailers, not directly purchasing from the manufacturer, to bring lawsuits
for treble damages, caused from and related to, the manufacturer's sale
to a wholesaler without having sufficient "supervision" over the whole-
saler's selling prices, to be certain that indirect buying retailers are pay-
ing no more than larger direct buying retailers.
Perkins makes clear that in a lawsuit for treble damages the re-
tailer must prove that his injury was caused by the manufacturer's
original price discrimination being "passed on!' (or not being passed
on as in Fred Meyer) to the retail level. For example, a multi-product
retailer may be unable to prove injury from price discrimination caused
by the purchase of only one product at an unfavorable price. All or
only part of the favored price may be passed (or not passed as in
the Fred Meyer case) through the wholesaler to the retailer. The
retailer may injure his business by over-pricing his product, he may be
injured by failure to geographically locate his business as well as the
favored retailer or, the retailer's injury may be due to a more efficient
business operation by the favored retailer. If the retailer might have
obtained a lower price for the same product from a different supplier,
his failure to do so would break the causal connection between the price
discrimination and the injury.28 These factors show the possibility that
the retailer's injury may result, in whole or in part, not only from his
supplier's pricing policies, but from other factors of causation which
may diminish or eliminate his recoverable damages.
A retailer's claim for damages resulting from price discrimination
by a supplier might be defeated by the Robinson-Patman Act's statutory
defenses.24 If in the case of a favored retailer the supplier were actually
22 See cases cited supra note 19.
28 Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTCC, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964).
24 Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964) provides
in relevant part:
(a) . . . [Tlhat nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make
only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are
to such purchasers sold or delivered ...
(b) . .. [T]hat nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the
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meeting a competitor's equally low price to the retailer, this fact would
remove the supplier's liability to retailers purchasing through a whole-
saler.2 5 A large retailer may legally purchase, at cost-justified quantity
price discounts, to the detriment of competing small retailers whether
purchasing directly or through wholesalers.2 0
In Perkins, the Court apparently required evidence that the manu-
facturer had knowledge of the injury to the direct buying retailer
caused by wholesalers "passing on" their lower prices to the indirect
buying retailer.27  This test for illegality under Section 2(a) in "dual
distribution" pricing situations makes the manufacturer responsible for
violation only if he had knowledge of the injury caused by the whole-
saler's "passing on" lower prices or failure to "pass on" lower prices.
Retail price familiarity by the manufacturer or complaints from re-
tailers being discriminated against (as in Perkins) are seemingly re-
quired, and failure to produce this information could defeat a retailer's
claim for damages.
Finally, the interpretation of Section 2 (a) which gives all retailers pur-
chasing through a wholesaler, the opportunity to purchase the same prod-
uct from a manufacturer at the same price that large direct buying re-
tailers pay may place'the manufacturer in jeopardy of violation of the
Sherman Act.28 In Fred Meyer, the Court concluded that the manu-
facturer could use his wholesaler, "consistently with other provisions
of the anti-trust laws,"29 to distribute promotional payments to indirect
buying retailers. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Fred Meyer,80 noted
that Albrecht v. Herald Co., 1 a price fixing case, would make it un-
prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of
services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to
meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished
by a competitor.
25 American Oil Co. v. F1'C, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
954 (1964).
26 Reid v. Harper & Bros., 235 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952
(1956). The discount must be justified by reduced cost of manufacturing or by re-
duction in the cost of packaging or delivery. Conjectural accounting estimates of these
factors may be considered by the jury.
27 See cases cited supra note 12.
28 Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal ....
29 FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 358 (1968). Compare Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), with Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
30 FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 361 n.4 (1968).
31 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
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lawful "per se" for a manufacturer to require a wholesaler to pass
through an advertising allowance to his retail customers. Similarly, an
illegal combination in restraint of the wholesaler may result if the manu-
facturer and small retailer agreed in such a way that the wholesaler
could not absorb promotional allowances.
CONCLUSION
A case has not yet arisen which allows the United States Supreme
Court to extend the Fred Meyer advertising allowance theory under
Section 2(d) to price discrimination under Section 2(a). Nor has there
been a ruling by that Court allowing treble damages to a plaintiff
who has not dealt directly with the seller-defendant. Both Fred Meyer
and Perkins, however, illustrate the Court's tendency to interpret the
Robinson-Patman Act to protect small retailers against the purchasing
power of the large buyer. Even though Fred Meyer was a governmental
injunctive action against a retailer, these cases seemingly place liability
for unfair treatment of small retailers squarely on the manufacturer-
seller. Based on these cases it seems reasonable to speculate that the
Court will: 1) require manufacturers selling to both wholesalers and re-
tailers at different prices to not "knowingly" sell or allow others to sell
their products to competing retailers at discriminatory prices, and 2)
if manufacturers allow this, the Court will permit direct or indirect buy-
ing retailers to recover from manufacturers damages caused by the price
discrimination.
Manufacturers selling to wholesalers and retailers now appear to
have the responsibility to act when they perceive an injury occur-
ring at the retail level due to competing direct and indirect buying
retailers paying different prices for their products. If a manufacturer
receives from retailers complaints that they are paying higher prices
than competing retailers because a wholesaler is failing to pass on
its lower prices to indirect buying retailers, the manufacturer would no
doubt be justified in refusing to sell to such a wholesaler if he con-
tinued to price in this manner.32 Any action taken cannot, however,
serve to fix prices or otherwise restrain wholesalers, unless the manu-
facturer has knowledge that such injury is occurring at the retail level.
A manufacturer might also adjust its own selling prices to wholesalers
or direct buying retailers to reduce or eliminate differences between
prices charged to direct and indirect buying retailers.
32 This again could give rise to a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1. See
note 28 supra.
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Small retailers who get no relief after complaining to the manufacturer
will likely find the courts receptive to their complaints, although the
chances of success of such litigation are lessened under Section 2(a) by:
1) various statutory requirements such as "like grade and quality" and
"interstate commerce", 2) statutory defenses such as cost justification,
3) the requirement that the injury be caused by the price discrimina-
tion, 4) the possible requirement that the manufacturer have knowl-
edge of the injury, and 5) the ambiguities and inconsistencies of
present law.
